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In this paper we study how prior tax notice (following audit and detection of tax fraud 
by Tax Authorities) affects individual behaviour in terms of tax compliance. We start 
with a very stylised theoretical framework, considering a situation in which an 
individual has been already audited and caught as tax evader, and knows that the Tax 
Authorities are looking for her to cash the due amount of taxes. We concentrate on the 
decision to move in order to avoid paying the bill, and derive the optimal number of 
times an individual should move equalising marginal costs and benefits of the decision. 
We then carry out an empirical analysis based on real data provided by an Italian 
collection agency for the period 2004-2007. Our results show that previous notice 
reduces the probability to move, but its cost is not large enough to correct the individual 
incentive to escape Tax Authorities. 
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1. Introduction 
Tax evasion is one of the most important problems the Italian Tax Administration needs 
to tackle. At the macroeconomic level, the latest available estimate of the “tax gap” is at 
least 7% of GDP (Visco, 2007), a figure much higher than those observed in the other 
EU countries and similar to other Mediterranean economies (e.g., Schneider and Enste, 
2000). Consequently, even if the Italian total tax burden is similar to the EU average, 
the effective tax distribution among taxpayers is very different. In addition, as in almost 
all countries, the propensity of the Italian citizens to evade taxes has increased in the last 
decade (e.g., Cannari and D’Alessio, 2007, for Italy; Schneider and Enste, 2000, for 
other countries). Several reasons can explain this situation: the production structure of 
the Italian economic system, characterised by a high share of small-medium sized firms; 
a low general reprobation among citizens due to tax evasion; the complexity of the Tax 
Code; but also factors linked to the audit and post-audit stages, like the high percentage 
of court trials that end with the taxpayers’ win, or the inefficiency of the organization of 
the Tax Authority and of the collection system. With respect to the last of these 
problems, according to available estimates, only 0.55% of the total amount on the 
taxpayer’s rolls has been cashed by collection agencies in 2002, even less than the 1.8% 
cashed in 2000-2001 (Servizio Politiche Fiscali UIL, 2005). These data underlines that, 
in addition to the inefficiency of the Tax Administration, the collection system after tax 
evasion has been detected plays a crucial role in both the extension and the persistency 
of tax evasion in Italy as elsewhere
1. 
The standard theoretical literature on tax evasion and its extensions (discussed in 
Section 3) typically take a “prior-to-audit” point of view. It focuses on the determinants 
of tax evasion, as for instance its responsiveness to variations in the income level and 
tax-enforcement parameters, using a basic one-period expected utility approach. Some 
                                                 
1 A vivid example is US. According to Burman (2003), “the IRS assesses almost $30 billion of taxes that 
it will never collect. This is not theoretical tax evasion. The $30 billion represents underpayments of tax 
that the IRS has identified but cannot collect because its staff is spread so thin. […] According to IRS 
estimates, 60 percent of identified tax debts are never collected. These unclosed cases include: 75% of 
identified nonfilers; 79% of taxpayers who use “known abusive devices” to avoid taxes; 78% of taxpayers 
identified through document matching programs. It is possible that some of these people simply cannot 
afford to pay their tax debts, but more than half – 56% – of noncompliant taxpayers with incomes over 
$100,000 get off scot-free. It is demoralizing to honest taxpayers, and encouraging to tax scofflaws, that 
your odds are better than even of avoiding your tax bill, even if you are caught”.   3
recent contributions investigate the dynamics of tax compliance in order to consider the 
current compliance as a function of past reports and audit experiences, but their findings 
on the responsiveness of evasion decisions to past audit experiences do not lead to 
univocal conclusions. Also the empirical works do not find univocal conclusions: the 
findings of the laboratory experiments, for instance, partially conflict with those 
obtained by actual evasion data. Moreover, since real data are lacking, there are very 
few natural experiments. 
Differently from the literature, in this study we take a “post-audit-post-
detection” point of view. We focus on individuals who have been already caught by Tax 
Authorities as noncompliant, and can then decide to runaway, “changing their address” 
several times in order to hide out and escape collection agents, to avoid paying their bill 
(i.e., behave as scofflaws): according to the data we obtained from an Italian collection 
agency, this is what happens in the real world for a considerable number of tax evaders. 
In order to design our empirical strategy, we provide a very stylised theoretical 
framework for this behaviour, considering both costs and benefits associated to the 
decision to “move”. As for costs, we consider those borne by taxpayers once they 
decide to runaway to escape Tax Authorities, and the additional ones of non-compliance 
associated with the detection experience. Our aim is to identify what is the impact on 
actual behaviours of this administrative procedure, whose consequences for the 
taxpayers depend on the enforcement policy adopted by Tax Authorities. We find 
empirically a negative impact of a previous notice on the probability to move. However, 
considering also other variables which can affect this decision (e.g., age, gender, and 
due amount), the implicit (psychological) costs seem to be not large enough to 
discourage tax evaders to runaway in order to escape Tax Authorities. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the tax collection 
procedure in Italy, with a particular emphasis on the collection of taxes by taxpayers’ 
roll. Section 3 reviews the economic literature on tax evasion and the role of prior audit, 
suggesting that this is the first attempt to assess the “effectiveness” of the audit process, 
looking at what happen after tax evasion has been detected. In Section 4 we propose a 
simple and stylised model of individual choice to study how the taxpayer’s decision to   4
move in order to avoid paying the bill is affected by prior notice. Section 5 presents the 
data and our empirical models. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The collection of taxes by taxpayers’ roll 
In this section we briefly describe the institutional features characterising the notice 
procedure in Italy. The collection of taxes is the final step in taxpayer’s obligation, 
when the taxpayer’s payment accrues to the Tax Administration. There are three 
possible ways for this to happen: (a) the direct withholding taxation by the Tax 
Administration (e.g., in the case of direct payment of earnings to public employees); (b) 
the self-taxation, which represents the normal way of tax payment: like in almost all the 
countries, the Italian tax system is based on voluntary compliance, so that taxpayers are 
expected to understand and comply with their tax obligations; finally, (c) the collection 
of taxes by taxpayers’ roll, which represents the “extra-ordinary” way of tax payment. 
In particular, this is the way taxes are collected after an audit and a detection of 
fraud has occurred. When - for some individuals - the self-taxation did not (properly) 
happened, the Tax Authorities that should have received the payments needs first to 
ascertain the amount of taxes that these individuals should have paid (audit); then 
authorities issue a tax roll, i.e. a list of taxpayers and of their tax due amounts including 
fees, interests and collection agency’s premium. The tax roll becomes a document of 
execution with the sign of the legal ownership of the tax authority that issued that tax 
roll. Notice also that the tax roll clearly includes all payments to be due to a Public 
Administration, e.g. income taxes and local taxes as well as other revenue receipts, like 
royalty rents, licence fees and administrative sanctions. 
All the tax rolls issued by all the Tax Authorities are periodically sent to a 
collection agency in charge of collecting taxes in a specific geographical area on the 
basis of the taxpayers’ residence. It is up to the collection agency to notice to each 
individual included in a tax roll the amount of taxes that are requested (in other words, 
to bring the bill). According to the Italian law, the notice must happen within the set 
time limit that lie between one and three years according to the kind of audit. 
The notice plays a crucial role, because only noticed tax debts allow the Tax 
Authorities to legally expropriate taxpayer assets whenever the taxpayer did not paid her   5
due amount within the set time limit (two months starting from the day of the notice). 
The most important problem of the collection agencies is that in many cases the 
taxpayer is difficult to find or, in extreme cases, her address is unknown (because she 
hides out). This underlines the importance of the issue we approach in this paper: if the 
collection agency is not able to discover where the taxpayer hides, then the notice will 
not take place in the set time limit. Moreover, even if the law provide for the notice to 
happen without finding the taxpayer, its effectiveness is clearly flawed. This means that 
the individual will not be affected by her illegal behaviour. Hence, hiding her own 
address to Tax Authorities (e.g., by frequently changing it) is a way to avoid fiscal 
obligation and to render meaningless the provisions of the Tax Code. 
On the contrary, the individual to whom a tax return form has been noticed has 
two opportunities: he can pay or not the due amount to the collection agency within two 
months. If she pays, then her obligation comes to an end. Otherwise she can appeal 
against the tax return form to the Tax Court, or can simply decide not to pay, behaving 
as a scofflaw. If he decides not to pay, then the collection agency starts the enforcement 
within a year from the day of return notice, by expropriating taxpayer assets (if she 
clearly has some). Therefore, receiving a notice can bear several monetary and 
psychological costs that are likely to influence taxpayer’s future compliance. Identifying 
this impact is our goal in the analysis to follow. 
3. The economic literature on tax evasion and the role of prior audit 
Literature on tax evasion typically studies how compliance is affected by prior audit, 
without asking what happens after tax frauds have been detected. In the benchmark 
economic approach of modelling tax compliance, individual reporting decisions are the 
result of a process of expected utility maximization, and the taxpayer merely behaves 
like a gambler. The pioneering models were proposed over thirty years ago in the 
studies by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Srinivasan (1973) and Yitzhaki (1974), 
which were primarily interested in analysing the responsiveness of tax evasion with 
respect to variations in the (exogenous) income level and standard tax-enforcement   6
parameters (i.e., audit probability, fine and tax rate).
2 This basic paradigm was followed 
by a large number of theoretical contributions which generalized the original model in 
several directions, as well as by a variety of empirical research (based on actual evasion 
data, surveys on taxpayer attitudes and laboratory experiments) aiming at testing their 
resulting predictions, especially the ones that are inconclusive or appear conflicting with 
the common sense.
3 A first important generalization considered the endogeneity of 
taxpayer’s income by adding labour supply to the model, making more ambiguous the 
effects of enforcement variables on reporting decisions.
4 Another important extension 
was the development of models where the audit probability is not constant, but is a 
function of reported income and is determined jointly with tax compliance as part of an 
equilibrium within a standard game-theory framework.
5 Hinging on the argument that 
the traditional paradigm, based on rational and selfish agents, tends to predict too much 
evasion (for given values of fine-audit parameters) compared to the levels actually 
observed, in the last decades both theoretical and empirical literature on tax compliance 
has increasingly accounted for social and ethical considerations
6. Main findings suggest 
that factors such as, for instance, moral obligations to be honest, the social consequences 
of being known as a cheater (social stigma), or the taxpayers’ perception of the fairness 
of her tax burden with respect to others, play a major role in explaining individual 
                                                 
2 Under fairly general assumptions about individual risk preferences, the standard expected utility model 
supports the propositions that people with higher personal income tend to evade more, and that increasing 
any of the tax-enforcement parameters will reduce the amount of concealed income. For an exhaustive 
and critical discussion of the main findings deriving from the basic tax compliance model refer to Cowell 
(2003) and Sandmo (2006). 
3 For a comprehensive review of the literature on tax compliance see the recent surveys by Andreoni et al. 
(1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) and Cowell (2003). 
4 Such an extension was proposed, among the others, by Pencavel (1979), Cowell (1981) and Sandmo 
(1981). 
5 These models allowing for strategic interaction between taxpayers and Tax Authority were conceived 
not only to generate predictions about compliance level, bat also to have some useful insights about a tax 
agency’s optimal audit procedure. See, e.g., the pioneering analyses by Greenberg (1984), Reinganum and 
Wilde (1985, 1986) and Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and the later developments by Mookherjee 
and P’ng (1989), Sansing (1993), Erard and Feinstein (1994) and Cronshaw and Alm (1995). 
6 Feld and Frey (2002, 2006) mention this issue as a major empirical problem with the standard expected 
utility framework. On the basis of data for Switzerland (1970-1995), they assert that it is impossible to 
account for observed compliance only in terms of expected punishment, whereas tax morale, that is the 
intrinsic motivation of taxpayers to comply with their fiscal obligations, assumes a central role. Indeed, 
given the average probability of audit, the penalties typically assessed for non-compliance and what one 
knows about the degree of risk aversion from other contexts, tax evasion should be much higher than it 
actually is.   7
evasion decisions and significantly improve the  adequacy of the  basic  paradigm in 
modelling tax compliance behaviour.
7 
As remarked in Andreoni et al. (1998) and Cowell (2003), ignoring the dynamic 
nature of the reporting problem represents another relevant shortcoming of the basic 
one-period expected utility approach. Indeed, this approach assumes that each year 
basically the same gamble takes place, without considering any “memory” in taxpayer 
reporting decision. However, in practice taxpayers are likely to condition their current 
compliance on past reports and audit experiences. Individuals that were audited and 
caught evading incurred several costs. The first is the burden of repaying past due taxes 
plus interests and penalties charged by the Tax Administration on unreported income. 
Other relevant costs include pecuniary and psychological costs of enduring audits and 
court trials, as well as other potential sanctions imposed on individuals found guilty of 
major crimes. One would expect that all these costs implied by a prior audit somehow 
affect subsequent tax compliance behaviour. Therefore, accounting for the repeated 
nature of the reporting decision, by allowing the taxpayer to exploit information from 
multiple time periods, represents an interesting generalization of the basic expected 
utility model. Nevertheless, there currently exists a very restricted number of theoretical 
contributions analysing the dynamics of tax compliance, and their findings on the 
responsiveness of evasion decisions to past audit experiences do not lead to univocal 
conclusions. 
Building within the alternative “prospect theory” framework
8, Kahneman et al. 
(1982) have highlighted the importance of the so-called “possibility effect”, a particular 
heuristic rule used by decision-makers according to which individuals tend to assess the 
                                                 
7 Among the theoretical contributions going towards the direction to incorporate ethical and social norms 
into the basic gamble paradigm, see Gordon (1989), Bordignon (1993) and Myles and Naylor (1996). On 
the empirical side, recent studies discussing the relevance of social and moral dimensions of tax evasion, 
on the basis of both survey and experimental data, include Evans and Kelly (2001), Torgler (2001, 2003), 
Cummings et al. (2005), Wenzel (2005a,b), Fiorio and Zanardi (2006) and Cannari and D’Alessio (2007). 
8 Recognizing that expected utility paradigm may miss out important features of people’s preferences in 
face of uncertainty, several researchers (mainly working in the field of economic psychology and 
sociology) have examined tax compliance in the light of the “prospect theory” originally proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The key issue is that the response to a particular economic incentive (e.g. 
a change in tax enforcement) would differ according to the context in which it was perceived (framing 
hypothesis). Cowell (2003) points out that, in spite of the increasing support received by prospect theory 
with respect to the standard expected utility paradigm, direct empirical tests of conformity of real 
behaviour with prospect theory have been inconclusive.   8
probability of a certain event by bringing to mind the number of times that similar 
events happened in the past. This leads to assume that the taxpayers audited in the past 
attribute a higher value to the probability to be audited in the future, and then exhibit 
more compliance in comparison with taxpayer without prior audits, even in the presence 
of a totally random audit procedure. More recently, Engel and Hines (1999) derive a 
dynamic tax evasion model including retrospective audits, and find that the cumulative 
compliance incentives are quite complex and, in general, simulation analysis is required 
to make predictions. As for, in particular, the taxpayers’ response after an audit, their 
results reveal that there is an incentive to evade a significant amount in the year 
immediately following the prior audit, overshooting the steady-state level of tax 
evasion. However, in the second year after the audit, taxpayers become conscious of 
their excessive evasion in the year before, and therefore increase their compliance to a 
level above the steady-state. After a short period of dampening oscillation, the process 
converges to a steady-state where the taxpayer who is no more audited evades the same 
income share in the following years. Finally, Snow and Warren (2007) have extended 
the standard expected utility one-period model of tax evasion to an inter-temporal 
framework where taxpayers face uncertainty about the probability of being audited and 
update their beliefs taking prior audit experience as relevant information. They show 
that tax compliance significantly reacts to the Bayesian updating of beliefs about the 
probability of being audited in the future based on prior audit, in a way which depends 
on the specific risk aversion characteristics of taxpayers. In particular, for a large variety 
of risk preferences, Bayesian updating increases present and expected future tax 
evasion. 
On the empirical side, results based on real data are uncommon, and empirical 
tests on the post-audit-post-detection stage are completely lacking. According to the few 
studies available, the limited evidence on the tax compliance effect implied by a prior 
audit experience is not conclusive. Spicer and Hero (1985) have been the first to directly 
test the “possibility effect” proposed by Kahneman et al. (1982) trough a ten-rounds 
laboratory experiment. Their results reveal a statistically significant negative 
relationship between tax evasion in the final round and the number of prior audits. The 
succeeding experiments by Benjamini and Maital (1985) and Webley (1987) also find   9
that being audited in earlier rounds significantly increase subsequent tax compliance. 
However, studies based on actual evasion data partially conflict with these experimental 
findings. Long and Schwarz (1987), analysing panel data on the outcomes of audits 
carried out by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1969 and 1971 on the same 
taxpayers, conclude that the 1969 audit was only marginally effective in reducing the 
frequency of evasion in 1971, and was not effective at all as for the average magnitude 
of non-compliance among those taxpayers who continued to cheat. Erard (1992) studies 
the deterrent effect of an ordinary prior audit experience using 1982 information from 
the U.S. Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), and finds a small and 
statistically insignificant coefficient for the prior audit variable, revealing a negligible 
impact of earlier audit experiences on future tax evasion behaviour. The study by 
Bergman and Nevarez (2006) – based on real data on VAT tax return in Argentina and 
Chile – suggests a non-negligible impact of prior audit. In particular, audited and 
sanctioned taxpayers decreases net payments and future compliance, in a sense self-
compensating for the “losses” produced by audits. Moreover, the perverse impact of 
audits is larger for “big” evaders (i.e., the cheaters): the higher tax evasion, the less 
likely it is taxpayers will reduce noncompliance due to audit; on the contrary, the lower 
tax evasion, the more likely is taxpayers will increase compliance after the audit. Hence, 
econometric results so far indicate that resorting to the “stick” to increase tax 
compliance may not have any long-run effect (or even have an impact contrary to 
expectations). As Andreoni et al. (1998) emphasize, further research is then needed to 
confirm whether there is any specific deterrent impact associated with a prior audit and 
to understand the reasons underlying the presence or the absence of such an effect. In 
the following analysis we bring the investigation one step forward, looking at how audit 
and detection affect the likelihood Tax Authorities will really cash their money. 
4. A simple theoretical model 
In order to provide a theoretical framework for our empirical analysis, we develop here 
a very simple and stylised model of individual choice based on the expected utility 
paradigm a là Allingham-Sandmo, which includes also the costs borne by taxpayers 
once they decide to runaway to escape tax notice, and the additional costs of non-  10
compliance associated with the notice experience. More precisely, the reference context 
is that of an individual who has already decided to evade taxes, has been audited and 
detected to be a tax evader, and knows that the Tax Authorities are (sooner or later) 
looking for her for noticing the due amount of taxes. In particular, according to the 
Italian Law (but the same is true for other countries), and starting from institutional 
details outlined in previous section, the Tax Authorities need first to ascertain the 
amount of taxes that the individual should have paid, and then to notice to the individual 
the amount of taxes that are requested. The notice is important, for only noticed tax 
debts allow authorities to legally expropriate taxpayer assets. Hence, individuals might 
choose to escape the effects of tax notice, behaving as scofflaws. There are several ways 
to do so. In the light of the following empirical analysis, here we concentrate on the 
decision to “change address”, i.e. to hide out in order to avoid notice. We assume that 
“changing address” allows tax evaders to reduce the probability to be really caught by 
Tax Authorities. We study how the decision to move is affected by the experience of a 
prior tax notice, i.e. the fact of being caught as tax evaders and having received the 
request from Tax Authorities to pay due past taxes plus fines. 
Let W be the exogenous taxpayer (gross) income, F the amount of taxes evaded 
plus additional fees imposed once tax evasion has been detected by Tax Authorities, τ 
the additional costs borne by the taxpayer once she decides to move, κ the additional 
costs of non compliance because of the notice, T the total burden (both monetary and 
psychological costs) following tax evasion, s the number of times the individual decides 
to runaway to escape notice. The expected total burden after tax evasion can be written 
as: 
[] ) )( ( 0 ) ( 1 ) )( ( ) ( κ κ + = − + + = F s p s p F s p T E       ( 1 )  
where p is the probability of being detected as a function of the number of times the 







, so that the probability of being notified 
decreases with the number of address changes.   11
Under the assumption of risk-neutrality
9, the expected taxpayer utility, once she evaded 
taxes, can then be written as: 
() [] [ ] [ ] ) ( ) )( ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 s s F s p W s s T E W NW U E τ τ κ τ τ + − + − = + − − =    (2) 
where NW is the total expected income (net of taxes and costs of moving),  1 τ s and 
) ( 2 s τ  are respectively the fixed and variable costs of moving and “changing address”. 
For instance, fixed costs of moving are related to all the basic items the taxpayer needs 
to bring to her new domicile each time she moves, whereas variable costs of moving are 
related to the difficulties in finding a new domicile. We assume that the variable costs of 
moving increase with the decision to move (i.e.,  0





), for example because it is 
more difficult to hide once a tax evader has already done so. 
Starting from the risk-neutrality hypothesis, the problem of each individual once 
she has evaded taxes is to choose s in order to maximize the expected income NW. 
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 of this decision. Costs are both fixed and 
variable, and they are related to changing address; benefits are given by the reduction in 
the expected tax burden stemming from the reduction in the probability to receive the 
tax notice. It is immediate to observe from Eq. (4) that a corner solution emerges (i.e., 
0 * = s ), whenever marginal costs of moving are higher than marginal benefits for any 
0 > s ; we will take into account this possibility in the empirical part of the paper. 
                                                 
9 We are aware that individual attitudes toward risk might be important in determining illegal behaviour. 
However, here we are simply describing with a very simple model costs and benefits related to the choice 
of moving to escape Tax Authorities as a guide for the empirical analysis. For further comments on this 
issue see below.   12
Notice also that, if marginal benefits are higher than marginal costs for any  0 > s , then 
the individual optimal strategy is to keep moving away indefinitely. 
Apart from these two extreme cases, the above condition (4) implicitly define s* 
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We can then exploit the implicit function theorem to study how s* changes with respect 
to changes in exogenous parameters F, κ, and τ. Considering in particular κ (which can 
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. At this point, one should notice that the S.O.C. for a maximum in 
Eq. (2) implies the denominator in Eq. (5) to be strictly positive. As for the sign of Eq. 







, which we may dub the 
“predictability effect of moving”. Intuitively, running away and frequently changing her 
own domicile can have two potential effects: on the one hand, it can make individual 
behaviour more “predictable” for collection agencies and Tax Authorities, with 





















If this is true, then an increase in the additional costs of non compliance - stemming 
from a notice - will imply a higher s*, for the individual will obtain a marginal benefit 
on the increase in κ only at a cost of moving more. On the other hand, running away can 
                                                 
10 Notice that the denominator of Eq. (5) can be positive even when  0 ) (
2
2
2 < ∂ ∂ s s τ  but 
0 ) (
2 2 > ∂ ∂ s s p  and sufficiently large; or  0 ) (
2 2 < ∂ ∂ s s p  but  0 ) (
2
2
2 > ∂ ∂ s s τ  and sufficiently 
large.   13
imply a “learning effect” for the individual, who will escape more easily Tax 
Authorities; but this can result only removing the assumption of risk-neutrality. 
In other words, assuming risk neutral individuals, our simple analysis suggests 
that increasing the total fee F imposed by Tax Authorities once evasion has been 
discovered, or increasing the additional (psychological) costs of non compliance (for 
instance through a Tax Notice) induces a positive change in the optimal s*. This is our 
working hypothesis to be tested in the following empirical analysis, which represents 
the core of our paper. 
5. The econometric analysis 
5.1. Empirical strategy 
Starting from the simple theoretical model described in the previous section, we study 
here the choice of moving by using an array of different discrete choice models 
proposed in the literature. Our dependent variable is clearly s*, which we consider in a 
first group of models as the “probability of moving to escape the effects of a tax notice”, 
and then as the “number of times an individual has moved” (exactly like in our 
theoretical model). We assume s* to be idiosyncratic to each individual (here scofflaw), 
and take into account in some models unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. 
Moreover, in all the models we also provide a rough control for heterogeneity across 
individual groups, by looking at common cultural factors that the literature deems to be 
important in influencing tax evasion (like age, gender, the area where an individual was 
born). Our baseline specification for the first group of models is: 
) , ( ) 1 Pr( ) 0 * Pr( α i i i i i z F z s z s = = = >        ( 6 )  
where the LHS variable is defined as the probability an individual moves, which is 
clearly equal to 1 when the i-th individual has moved at least once (i.e.  0 *> i s ), and 0 
when she never moved;  ) (⋅ F  is alternatively assumed to be the standard normal CDF 
and the Logistic CDF (resulting respectively in probit and logit models); z is a vector of 
regressors, and α a vector of corresponding parameters to be estimated. The vector z 
includes proxy measures for F (the amount of taxes evaded plus fee imposed once tax 
evasion has been ascertained by Tax Authorities), and κ (the additional costs of non   14
compliance). We also add controls for heterogeneity across individuals, like age, 
gender, and a set of dummy variables for the different geographical areas where an 
individual was born (which can proxy for cultural differences with respect to tax 
compliance). We finally explicitly allow for a treatment of unobserved individual 
heterogeneity by considering – whenever technically feasible – both random and fixed 
effects specification of our Eq. (6)
11. 
In the second group of models, we study directly s* (i.e., the number of times an 
individual has moved) by considering standard tobit models. The baseline specification 
is: 
0 * 0 ; 0 * * ); , ( ≤ = > = = i i i i i i i s if s s if s s x F s β       ( 7 )  
where  ) (⋅ F  is based on the standard normal CDF, x and β are a (partially) different set 
of regressors and corresponding parameters to be estimated, and the observability rule 
allows us to take into account the corner solution obtained in the theoretical model, 
which – from Eq. (4) – occurs whenever marginal costs of moving are higher than 
marginal benefits (implying  0 *≤ i s ). Also in this second group of models, we allow for 
a treatment of unobserved heterogeneity by considering random effects tobit models. 
We also estimate a generalized double-hurdle model, allowing for a possible 
correlation between the unobserved error terms of the two random processes, the 
participation process and the one explaining the number of address changes. The 
specification is: 
0 ) , ( ) 0 Pr( 0 ) , ( * ) , ( > + = > > + = + = u z F s and v x F s if v x F s i i i i i i α β β  (8) 
where z, x, α, and β are defined as before; u and v are the error terms of the two 
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where ρ clearly measures the correlation between the unobserved error terms. 
                                                 
11 Recall that a fixed effects specification is not feasible in probit models. See e.g. Greene (2008), for 
details.   15
5.2. Data and variables 
In this section we describe the data on which our empirical test is based, as well as the 
definition of some key variables used in the analysis. Our data comprise two distinct 
datasets: one refers to the province of Trento, and the other one to the province of 
Modena, two well-developed provinces located in the North of Italy, similar in term of 
inhabitants and per-capita income, but different in terms of political orientation
12. Data 
include information on individuals that (at least once) decided not to regularly pay their 
taxes or other revenue receipts in the period march 2004 - march 2007, and that were 
audited and detected by Tax Authorities. 
The original data unit is the individual tax return form. As described in Section 
2, the rolls issued in every set time period by Tax Authorities are sent to the collection 
agencies, so that every collection agency registers the total amount of each individual’s 
due sum in that period in a tax return form. We have information on 63,211 individual 
tax return forms accrued to 34,645 individuals (69.6% male and 30.4% female) in the 
province of Trento; and 170,500 tax return forms accrued to 78,281 individuals (68.4% 
male and 31.6% female) in the province of Modena. Within each dataset, we selected 
the sub-samples containing tax return forms accrued to inhabitants in the province of 
Trento and Modena, independently from their birth place, i.e. accrued only to residents 
in the two provinces
13; this provides for a first control for the presence of tickets for 
traffic violation in our original data. In the Trento dataset, we remained with 13,779 
inhabitants (39.8% of all individuals in the dataset) and 28,159 tax return forms (44.5% 
of all tax return forms in the dataset); in the Modena dataset, these figures amount 
respectively to 41,453 inhabitants (53.0% of all individuals in the dataset) and 94,268 
tax return forms (55.3% of all tax return forms in the dataset). 
For each individual’s tax return form our data include information on: the day in 
which the collection agency received the mandate to cash the amount from Tax 
Authorities; age and gender of the individual to whom each tax return form refers to; the 
                                                 
12 In particular, Modena is more left-wing oriented than Trento. Political ideology is likely to influence 
tax evasion; see e.g. Cannari and D’Alessio (2007) for some proxies based on survey data. 
13 Notice that we eliminated from the original sample also all individuals for which place of residence is 
unknown. The main findings presented in the following section are not affected by these choices. 
Regressions based on the whole sample are available upon request to the authors.   16
Municipality in which the individual was resident at the time the tax return form was 
received by the collection agency; the Municipality (if the individual is Italian) or the 
State (for foreigners) in which the individual was born; the total due amount (a proxy 
for F); the existence of a prior notice (i.e., a prior audit, detection, and request to pay the 
amount of taxes evaded, a proxy for κ) for the same individual to which the form is 
referred for some (unspecified) previous tax form. Unfortunately, we have information 
only on the total amount of each tax return form, which corresponds to the sum of all 
revenue taxes, local taxes, fines, royalty rents, tickets and licence fees accrued to each 
individual in the period which the tax return form refers to. We provide a second rough 
control for this data limitation by grouping the total due amount into different classes, 
and by defining dummy variables referred to each class. Fines and tickets for traffic 
violation will mostly fall in the lowest classes; hence we are able to “isolate” their role 
in influencing individual decision to move in order to avoid paying the bill. 
For the estimation of the tobit models, we also build additional variables from 
the original ones; we defined in particular: the number of address changes at time t 
(cumulative address change) as the total number of times s* an individual has moved up 
to t; the number of prior notices at time t (cumulative prior notice) as the total number 
of times an individual has received a tax notice up to t  (a proxy for the total 
psychological costs κ); the total due amount at time t (cumulative due amount) as the 
total amount an individual should have paid up to t  (a proxy for total F), on the 
hypothesis that the individual will never pay her obligation
14. 
Some descriptive statistics for our sample are reported in Tables 1-6. Table 1 
shows the composition of the samples by gender and age class. The age distribution is 
similar for both sub-samples. Male represents 72.6% in the Trento sub-sample and the 
70.1% in the Modena one. The distribution by age class indicates that more than 80% of 
individuals are aged 25-65, with a half in the class 35-50. The age distribution by 
gender indicates that the compositions are similar but for the classes 35-50 (more male 
than female) and >65 (more female than male). Table 2 shows the composition of the 
                                                 
14 We also estimate a model without imposing this extreme hypothesis, by considering an alternative (but 
not less extreme) solution in which the individual will always pay her due amount each time she receives 
the tax form. These hypothesis are driven by the fact that we do not know if the individual has paid the 
amount charged in each form.   17
tax return forms by total due amount and gender of the individual to whom they refer to. 
About one fourth of the tax return forms is less than 100 euro; a half has an amount 
bigger than 100 euro and less than 1,000 euro. Only a small percentage of the tax return 
forms has an amount bigger than 10,000 euro. Table 3 shows the composition of the 
samples by gender and number of tax return forms accrued to each individual. About 
40% of the individuals has only one tax return form, while 35% has two or three of 
them and 12-13% four or five. People collecting more than five tax return forms are 10-
13%. Table 4 shows the number of address changes by gender. About a half of the 
individuals have not changed the address in the period: this is due to the fact that on 
average they have only one tax return form. About 30% of the individual changed once 
the address: they have on average three tax return forms. Small percentages of 
individuals changed more than once the address, because they have a considerable 
number of tax return forms. Similar conclusions appear considering the number of prior 
notices: no prior notice occurred if the number of tax return forms is very low, but the 
number of prior notices increases when the number of tax return forms for individual 
increases (Table 5). Finally, table 6 reports the summary statistics for all the variables 
used in the estimated models together with their corresponding definitions. 
5.3. Results 
Estimates of Eq. (6) and (7) are reported in Tables 7-8 and 9, respectively, and offer a 
fairly consistent picture of the behaviour of tax cheaters in terms of the decision to 
runaway in order to escape notice. Looking first at probit models (Tables 7a and 7b), 
prior notice (a proxy for additional costs of non compliance) decreases the probability 
of changing address, showing a deterrent role similar to that of prior audit proposed in 
Kahneman et al. (1982), and confirmed also by the empirical literature based on both 
laboratory experiments and real data discussed in the literature review section (e.g., 
Spicer and Hero, 1985; Benjamini and Maital, 1985; Webley, 1987; Bergman and 
Nevarez, 2006). In other words, prior notice goes in the right direction, by increasing 
for instance psychological costs, hence reducing the incentive to move and avoid paying   18
the bill
15. Coefficient estimates are very close in the two sub-samples, suggesting that 
the behaviour of tax evaders across provinces is quite similar. Moreover, coefficient 
estimates are very close also across different models, i.e. also considering individual 
heterogeneity with random effects models (MODEL PROBIT 2). Also for other regressors, 
estimates appear to be consistent across the two provinces. In particular, we observe a 
non linear effect of the due amount F, which impact is first increasing with respect to 
the lowest class (up to 100 euros), and then decreasing; but coefficient estimates are not 
always significant at the usual confidence levels. There is on the contrary a linearly 
increasing effect of age, statistically significant, with people older than 65 characterised 
by a higher probability of moving than younger individuals. Moreover, we observe also 
a gender effect, with females showing a higher probability of moving than males. 
Finally, country effects are almost always negative, suggesting that individuals borne in 
places different from where they actually live are less familiar with the social and 
economic context, hence they move less. A notable and surprising exception (at least for 
the Trento sub-sample) is given by people borne in Northern European countries; a 
possible explanation is the sharp increase registered in tax evasion in these countries in 
the last decades (e.g., Schneider and Enste, 2000). 
Logit models (Tables 8a and 8b) confirm these findings: prior notice still shows 
a negative impact on the probability of moving, with estimated coefficient greater in 
magnitude with respect to probit estimates as expected
16, and consistent across different 
specifications and alternative treatments of the unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. random 
effects, MODEL LOGIT 2, and fixed effects, MODEL LOGIT 3). The non linear relationship 
observed for the amount classes still holds, and the same is true for the linear 
relationship in age, which is increasing with respect to the reference class of individuals 
aged less than 25. Also the gender effect is confirmed, with females characterised by a 
higher probability of moving. Overall, estimates of Eq. (6) suggest that – after 
                                                 
15 We also interacted prior notice with the dummies identifying the due amount classes. However, as 
coefficients were not significantly different from zero, we decided to drop these interactions from the 
empirical models. 
16As reported by Amemiya (1981), and discussed also e.g. in Greene (2008), there is a widely observed 
relationship between logit and probit models; in particular, β
logit = 1.6 × β
probit.   19
controlling for a set of regressors including age, gender, proxies for F and for cultural 
factors – there is a sizeable impact of prior notice on the probability of moving. 
Tables 9a and 9b report estimates for tobit models separately for the two 
provinces, Trento and Modena. Again, as for probit models, results are fairly consistent 
across the two areas, suggesting that the behaviour of tax evaders is quite similar across 
geographical districts. Surprisingly, cumulative prior notice has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the number of times an individual changes address. In 
other words, individuals that received an higher number of notices are also the 
individuals that are characterised by a higher number of address changes s*. This 
finding is consistent also across different models, with magnitude increasing once 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity with random effects (MODELS TOBIT 2 and 3). 
In order to reconcile the impact of previous notice on the probability of moving 
with the present result on s*, we need to look deeper in coefficient magnitudes in 
probit/logit estimates. Consider for instance probit results for Trento (Table 7a, MODEL 
PROBIT 1): prior notice reduces the probability of moving by -0.278, while being aged 
more than 65 increases this same probability by 0.373. The combined impact of prior 
notice and age on the probability of moving is then positive. In other words, our 
estimates suggest that penalties stemming from prior notice go in the right direction in 
reducing the probability of moving, but are too weak in preventing such a behaviour. 
Hence, most people – even feeling the psychological burden of their non compliance – 
prefer to change address and avoid paying the bill. Consistently with our simple 
theoretical model, we find then support for the “predictability effect of moving”, with 
increasing marginal costs and decreasing marginal benefits associated to the decision to 
change address. 
This discussion shows that there is an hysteresis in the illegal behaviour of tax 
cheaters, with notice ineffective against scofflaws, a result that can also help explain the 
ineffectiveness of tax collection agencies in cashing the amount of tax forms. According 
to latest estimates, in Italy only 0.55% of the total amount on the taxpayer’s rolls has 
been cashed by collection agencies in 2002, even less than the 1.8% cashed in 2000-
2001 (e.g. Servizio Politiche Fiscali UIL, 2005); but the same is true also in the US, 
where 60% of identified tax debts are never collected (Burman, 2003). This result also   20
helps explain findings by Bergman and Nevarez (2006) on VAT enforcement in Chile 
and Argentina: tax audits have the perverse effect of increasing tax evasion (at least for 
the cheaters), again showing an hysteresis in illegal behaviour that enforcement activity 
by Tax Authorities are not able to stop. A policy implication of this results is that the 
negative impact of notice on the probability to move should be strengthened, for 
instance increasing social stigma associated to the illegal behaviour. 
As for the role of the other variables, age is a significant determinant of s* also 
in tobit models. There is an increasing positive relationship, which however disappears 
when considering the hypothesis according to which the individual will always pay her 
due amount each time she receives the tax form (MODEL TOBIT 3). In the latter case, 
indeed, s* linearly increases up to the age class 50-65, then starts dropping.
17 Also for 
the due amount, there is an increasing positive and significant relationship for the first 
two models, which again disappears for MODEL TOBIT 3 specification. Finally, there is 
now a negative gender effect, with females moving less than males. 
To check the robustness of the results discussed above, we have also estimated a 
generalized double-hurdle model (Table 10). Main findings concerning the participation 
process (i.e., the probability of “changing address”), as well as the number of times the 
individual moves (i.e., the cumulative “address change”), are confirmed in the two 
provinces, with a slightly higher impact of both prior notice and cumulative prior notice 
with respect to PROBIT and TOBIT estimates. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we study whether prior tax notice affects individual behaviour in terms of 
tax compliance. We consider the post-audit-post-detection context, i.e. we focus on 
individuals who have been already caught by Tax Authorities as non compliant and can 
then decide to runaway in order to avoid paying the amount of evaded taxes. We then 
concentrate on the decision to move, and consider the costs borne by taxpayers once 
                                                 
17 This evidence is consistent with previous econometric studies using U.S. TCMP data, which 
highlighted that non-compliance is significantly less common and of lower magnitude among households 
where the head is over age 65, and for the audit classes where the proportion over age 65 is greater. For 
more details see Andreoni et al. (1998, p. 840). A negative relationship between propensity towards non-
compliance and age is found in a recent study by Cannari and D’Alessio (2007) using data from the 2004 
Survey of Household Income and Wealth collected by the Bank of Italy.   21
they decide to runaway to escape notice and the additional costs of non-compliance 
associated with a prior tax notice experience. The problem is substantial for at least two 
reasons: only a small percentage of the total amount on the taxpayers’ rolls is cashed by 
collection agencies every year; actual data by collection agencies indicates that in many 
cases the taxpayers’ address is unknown, and a considerable percentage of taxpayers 
change address several times so as to avoid the impact of notice. 
In order to provide a framework for our empirical analysis, we propose a very 
simple and stylised theoretical model for the individual decision to move. As for the 
impact of prior tax notice on this decision, under the risk-neutrality hypothesis, we 
identify a “predictability effect of moving”. This arises whenever changing address 
several times makes individual more predictable for collection agencies, so that the 
number of times an individual decides to runaway to escape notice will increase. 
Our empirical analysis (based on real data provided by a tax collection agency) 
shows that prior tax notice decreases the probability of changing address; this result is 
consistent among tax evaders resident in the two Italian provinces we analysed. 
Moreover, we find that individuals with a higher number of prior notices are also the 
individuals characterised by a higher number of address’ changes. This implies that the 
previous notice is able to reduce the probability to move, but its cost is not large enough 
to correct the individual incentive to escape the effects of notice. 
Our conclusions can help to draw some policy recommendations in order to 
increase the percentage of the total amount on the taxpayers’ rolls cashed by collection 
agencies. Prior notice seems to be ineffective in most cases in reducing non compliance, 
so that psychological costs associated with this administrative action should be 
strengthened, e.g., by setting a shorter period within which the enforcement procedure 
may be applied and by publishing the names of tax evaders with a high number of 
“address changes” and large unresolved liabilities. Moreover, it could be worth 
increasing monetary costs by imposing a levy on tax evader’s bank account, as well as 
by making more difficult for her to get a loan or to buy or sell real and financial 
properties. 
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Table 6. Definition of variables and summary statistics 
Variables  Definition  Mean (St. dev.) 
      TRENTO MODENA
Continuous variables      
cumulative address change  Number of address change at time t 1.58 1.63
     (1.34) (1.41)
cumulative prior notice  Number of prior notices at time t 0.43 0.48
     (1.14) (1.09)
Dummy variables   
address change  The individual has moved to escape tax notice  0.54 0.52
prior notice  The individual has experienced a prior notice  0.13 0.15
male  The individual is a male  0.81 0.79
female  The individual is a female  0.19 0.21
due amount < 100 €  The amount of the tax roll is less than 100 € 0.24 0.21
100 < due amount < 2,000 €  The amount of the tax roll is between 100 and 2,000 € 0.61 0.64
2,000 < due amount < 50,000 €  The amount of the tax roll is between 2,000 and 50,000 € 0.15 0.14
due amount > 50,000 €  The amount of the tax roll is over 50,000 € 0.00 0.00
cumulative due amount < 50 €  The individual due amount is less than 50 € 0.00 0.01
50 < cumulative due amount < 100 €  The individual due amount is between 50 and 100 € 0.01 0.01
100 < cumulative due amount < 200 €  The individual due amount is between 100 and 200 € 0.05 0.04
200 < cumulative due amount < 500 €  The individual due amount is between 200 and 500 € 0.15 0.16
500 < cumulative due amount < 1,000 €  The individual due amount is between 500 and 1,000 € 0.14 0.15
1,000 < cumulative due amount < 2,000 €  The individual due amount is between 1,000 and 2,000 € 0.14 0.15
2,000 < cumulative due amount < 5,000 €  The individual due amount is between 2,000 and 5,000 € 0.21 0.21
5,000 < cumulative due amount < 10,000 €  The individual due amount is between 5,000 and 10,000 € 0.15 0.14
10,000 < cumulative due amount < 50,000 €  The individual due amount is between 10,000 and 50,000 € 0.12 0.12
cumulative due amount > 50,000 €  The individual due amount is over 50,000 € 0.03 0.02
18 < age < 25  The age of the individual is between 18 and 25  0.02 0.02
25 < age < 35  The age of the individual is between 25 and 35  0.23 0.24
35 < age < 50  The age of the individual is between 35 and 50  0.47 0.50
50 < age < 65  The age of the individual is between 50 and 65  0.21 0.18
age > 65  The age of the individual is over 65  0.06 0.06
born_NW Italy  Individual born in North West Italy  0.06 0.04
born_NE Italy  Individual born in North East Italy  0.51 0.01
born_Center Italy  Individual born in Center Italy  0.06 0.39
born_South Italy  Individual born in South Italy  0.13 0.29
born_world zone 5  Individual born in North Europe  0.01 0.01
born_world zone 6  Individual born in Continental Europe  0.02 0.01
born_world zone 7  Individual born in East and South East Europe  0.08 0.03
born_world zone 8  Individual born in North Africa  0.10 0.13
born_world zone 9  Individual born in Center and South Africa  0.01 0.03
born_world zone 10  Individual born in Asia  0.01 0.03
born_world zone 11  Individual born in North America or England as well as 
Australia  0.00 0.00
born_world zone 12  Individual born in Center and South America  0.02 0.01
born_world zone 13  Individual born in Arabia   - 0.00
Sample size     19,105 66,772
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Table 7a. Probit estimates for Province of Trento  
   MODEL PROBIT 1




d st. error    coefficient
d st. error  
Prior notice  -0.278 0.027 ***  -0.292 0.031 ***
female 0.057 0.024 **  0.047 0.029  
100 < due amount < 2,000 € 0.048 0.022 **  0.071 0.024 ***
2,000 < due amount < 50,000 € 0.048 0.030   0.083 0.033 ** 
due amount > 50,000 € -0.106 0.145   0.020 0.157  
25 < age < 35  0.093 0.061   0.123 0.073 * 
35 < age < 50  0.105 0.060 *  0.134 0.072 * 
50 < age < 65  0.174 0.062 ***  0.218 0.074 ***
age > 65  0.373 0.070 ***  0.386 0.083 ***
born_NW Italy  -0.071 0.039 *  -0.096 0.048 ** 
born_Center Italy  -0.087 0.041 **  -0.116 0.051 ** 
born_South Italy  -0.053 0.029 *  -0.085 0.036 ** 
born_world zone 5
c 0.209 0.086 **  0.201 0.105 * 
born_world zone 6  -0.044 0.071   -0.096 0.085  
born_world zone 7  -0.085 0.036 **  -0.139 0.044 ***
born_world zone 8  -0.156 0.032 ***  -0.199 0.041 ***
born_world zone 9  0.210 0.104 **  0.176 0.124  
born_world zone 10  -0.140 0.093   -0.199 0.118 * 
born_world zone 11  -0.382 0.207 *  -0.449 0.244 * 
born_world zone 12  -0.081 0.066   -0.147 0.082 * 
constant 0.008 0.061   0.076 0.073  
nr. observations   19,105     19,105    
Log-likelihood -13,049.06     -12,895.82    
LR test [p-value]           245.91 [0.000]    -    
Wald test [p-value]  -             209.39 [0.000]   
Pseudo R
2 0.01     -    
§ MODEL 1: probit on pooled data, MODEL 2: probit with individual random effects. 
a Dependent variable is Prob[address change]. 
b Reference individual: male, due amount < 100 €, age < 25, born in NE Italy, no prior audit. 
c World zone: 1 = NW Italy, 2 = NE Italy, 3 = Center Italy, 4 = South Italy, 5 = North Europe, 6 = Continental Europe, 7 = 
East and SE Europe, 8 = Nort Africa, 9 = Center and South Africa, 10 = Asia, 11 = North America, England and Australia, 
12 = Center and South America. 
d Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%. 
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Table 7b. Probit estimates for Province of Modena  
   MODEL PROBIT 1




d st. error    coefficient
d st. error  
Prior notice  -0.280 0.014 ***  -0.303 0.015 ***
female 0.114 0.012 ***  0.111 0.014 ***
100 < due amount < 2,000 € 0.010 0.012   0.027 0.013 ** 
2,000 < due amount < 50,000 € -0.083 0.017 ***  -0.042 0.018 ** 
due amount > 50,000 € -0.276 0.098 ***  -0.201 0.104 * 
25 < age < 35  0.103 0.036 ***  0.130 0.041 ***
35 < age < 50  0.141 0.035 ***  0.176 0.040 ***
50 < age < 65  0.215 0.036 ***  0.263 0.042 ***
age > 65  0.452 0.040 ***  0.495 0.046 ***
born_NW Italy  -0.040 0.025   -0.041 0.030  
born_NE Italy  -0.103 0.042 **  -0.122 0.050 ** 
born_South Italy  -0.061 0.012 ***  -0.073 0.015 ***
born_world zone 5
c 0.084 0.060   0.040 0.071  
born_world zone 6  -0.009 0.045   -0.025 0.053  
born_world zone 7  -0.098 0.028 ***  -0.137 0.034 ***
born_world zone 8  -0.124 0.016 ***  -0.159 0.019 ***
born_world zone 9  0.036 0.029   0.020 0.034  
born_world zone 10  -0.102 0.028 ***  -0.132 0.034 ***
born_world zone 11  0.144 0.105   0.119 0.122  
born_world zone 12  -0.126 0.044 ***  -0.148 0.053 ***
born_world zone 13  0.400 0.363   0.382 0.405  
constant -0.051 0.036   -0.013 0.041  
nr. observations   66,772     66,772    
Log-likelihood -45,701.62     -45,335.11    
LR test [p-value]        1,083.31 [0.000]     -    
Wald test [p-value]   -             954.17 [0.000]   
Pseudo R
2 0.01       -    
§ MODEL 1: probit on pooled data, MODEL 2: probit with individual random effects. 
a Dependent variable is Prob[address change]. 
b Reference individual: male, due amount < 100 €, age < 25, born in Center Italy, no prior audit. 
c World zone: 1 = NW Italy, 2 = NE Italy, 3 = Center Italy, 4 = South Italy, 5 = North Europe, 6 = Continental Europe, 7 = 
East and SE Europe, 8 = Nort Africa, 9 = Center and South Africa, 10 = Asia, 11 = North America, England and Australia, 
12 = Center and South America, 13 = Arabia. 
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Table 10a. Estimates of the generalized double-hurdle model for Province of Trento 
   PARTECIPATION PROCESS  NUMBER OF TIMES 
Regressors
a,b  coefficient st. error   coefficient  st. error  
prior notice  -0.375 0.028 ***   -   -  
cumulative prior notice   -  -   0.234  0.013 *** 
female 0.138 0.030 ***  -0.167  0.035 *** 
100 < due amount < 2,000 €  -0.013 0.025    -   -  
2,000 < due amount < 50,000 €  -0.157 0.033 ***   -   -  
due amount > 50,000 €  -0.389 0.148 ***   -   -  
cumulative due amount < 50 €   -  -   -2.412  0.300 *** 
100 < cumulative due amount < 200 €   -  -   -2.545  0.129 *** 
200 < cumulative due amount < 500 €   -  -   -2.410  0.103 *** 
500 < cumulative due amount < 1,000 €   -  -   -2.319  0.095 *** 
1,000 < cumulative due amount < 2,000 €   -  -   -2.177  0.096 *** 
2,000 < cumulative due amount < 5,000 €   -  -   -1.986  0.097 *** 
5,000 < cumulative due amount < 10,000 €   -  -   -1.711  0.095 *** 
10,000 < cumulative due amount < 50,000 €   -  -   -0.974  0.096 *** 
cumulative due amount > 50,000 €   -  -   -0.151  0.097  
25 < age < 35  0.054 0.074   0.137  0.098  
35 < age < 50  0.064 0.072   0.103  0.096  
50 < age < 65  0.146 0.075 **  0.054  0.098  
age > 65  0.534 0.092 ***  -0.113  0.109  
born_NW Italy  -0.099 0.045 **  0.099  0.056 * 
born_Center Italy  -0.150 0.046 ***  0.334  0.058 *** 
born_South Italy  -0.082 0.033 **  0.169  0.041 *** 
born_world zone 5
c 0.170 0.099 *  0.373  0.108 *** 
born_world zone 6  -0.047 0.086   0.138  0.101  
born_world zone 7  -0.092 0.041 **  0.102  0.052 * 
born_world zone 8  -0.203 0.035 ***  0.270  0.047 *** 
born_world zone 9  0.254 0.130 **  -0.011  0.136  
born_world zone 10  -0.165 0.106   0.150  0.140  
born_world zone 11  0.100 0.505   -0.684  0.461  
born_world zone 12  -0.092 0.077   0.136  0.098  
constant 0.254 0.074 ***  3.333  0.137 *** 
Nr. observations  19,105              
Log-likelihood -27,286      
σ   1.17  0.013 *** 
ρ         -0.27  0.039 *** 
a Dependent variables are Prob[address change] and cumulative address change.    
b Reference individual: male, due amount < 100 €, 50 < cumulative due amount < 100 €, age < 25, born in NE Italy, no 
prior audit. 
c World zone: 1 = NW Italy, 2 = NE Italy, 3 = Center Italy, 4 = South Italy, 5 = North Europe, 6 = Continental Europe, 7 = 
East and SE Europe, 8 = Nort Africa, 9 = Center and South Africa, 10 = Asia, 11 = North America, England and Australia, 
12 = Center and South America. 
d Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%. 
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Table 10b. Estimates of the generalized double-hurdle model for Province of Modena 
   PARTICIPATION PROCESS  NUMBER OF TIMES 
Regressors
a,b  coefficient  st. error     coefficient  st. error    
prior notice  -0.376 0.014 ***   -   -   
cumulative prior notice   -  -   0.246  0.008  *** 
female 0.203 0.015 ***  -0.226  0.020  *** 
100 < due amount < 2,000 €  -0.051 0.013 ***   -   -   
2,000 < due amount < 50,000 €  -0.291 0.018 ***   -   -   
due amount > 50,000 €  -0.577 0.100 ***   -   -   
cumulative due amount < 50 €   -  -   -0.035  0.086   
100 < cumulative due amount < 200 €   -  -   -0.093  0.078   
200 < cumulative due amount < 500 €   -  -   0.005  0.074   
500 < cumulative due amount < 1,000 €   -  -   0.227  0.075  *** 
1,000 < cumulative due amount < 2,000 €   -  -   0.484  0.076  *** 
2,000 < cumulative due amount < 5,000 €   -  -   0.781  0.075  *** 
5,000 < cumulative due amount < 10,000 €   -  -   1.490  0.076  *** 
10,000 < cumulative due amount < 50,000 €   -  -   2.158  0.077  *** 
cumulative due amount > 50,000 €   -  -   2.626  0.094  *** 
25 < age < 35  0.014 0.047   0.301  0.066  *** 
35 < age < 50  0.034 0.046   0.366  0.065  *** 
50 < age < 65  0.119 0.047 **  0.263  0.067  *** 
age > 65  0.457 0.053 ***  0.215  0.071  *** 
born_NW Italy  -0.046 0.030   0.041  0.040   
born_Center Italy  -0.107 0.049 **  0.046  0.068   
born_South Italy  -0.078 0.014 ***  0.103  0.019  *** 
born_world zone 5
c 0.076 0.070   0.195  0.090  ** 
born_world zone 6  0.019 0.054   -0.128  0.072  * 
born_world zone 7  -0.088 0.034 ***  0.042  0.048   
born_world zone 8  -0.126 0.018 ***  0.069  0.027  *** 
born_world zone 9  0.067 0.036 *  0.038  0.047   
born_world zone 10  -0.133 0.031 ***  0.114  0.045  ** 
born_world zone 11  0.109 0.118   0.328  0.150  ** 
born_world zone 12  -0.148 0.050 ***  0.030  0.071   
born_world zone 13  1.248 1.990   -0.684  0.729   
constant 0.245 0.047 ***  0.890  0.099  *** 
Nr. observations  66,772               
Log-likelihood -95,115          
σ     1.261  0.008  *** 
ρ          -0.320  0.018  *** 
a Dependent variables are Prob[address change] and cumulative address change. 
b Reference individual: male, due amount < 100 €, 50 < cumulative due amount < 100 €, age < 25, born in Center 
Italy, no prior audit. 
c World zone: 1 = NW Italy, 2 = NE Italy, 3 = Center Italy, 4 = South Italy, 5 = North Europe, 6 = Continental 
Europe, 7 = East and SE Europe, 8 = Nort Africa, 9 = Center and South Africa, 10 = Asia, 11 = North America, 
England and Australia, 12 = Center and South America, 13= Arabia. 
d Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%. 
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